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ABSTRACT
Arbitration has been the predominant form of dispute resolution in the
securities industry since the 1980s. Virtually all brokerage firms include
predispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) in their retail customer
contracts, and have successfully fought off challenges to their validity.
Additionally, the industry has long mandated that firms submit to arbitration
at the demand of a customer, even in the absence of a PDAA.
More recently, however, brokerage firms have been arguing that forum
selection clauses in their agreements with sophisticated customers (such as
institutional investors and issuers) supersede firms’ duty to arbitrate under
FINRA Rule 12200. Circuit courts currently are split over whether, under
general principles of contract interpretation, FINRA member firms can
circumvent their duty to arbitrate by inserting forum selection clauses in their
customer agreements.
Most of these courts have not addressed the argument that the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (section 29(a)) bars
securities firms from forcing customers to waive their right to arbitrate
disputes. The Supreme Court long ago interpreted section 29(a) to apply to
waivers of substantive rights arising under the Exchange Act. Is the right to
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arbitrate in the FINRA forum, which is heavily regulated by the SEC to
promote investor protection, a right that cannot be waived?
This Article will explore the interaction between the anti-waiver
provision of the Exchange Act, and the right of a customer to demand a
particular dispute resolution process. This Article argues that investors’
long-standing right to choose arbitration in the securities industry is a right
that brokerage firms cannot force their customers to waive.
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has long supported a
brokerage customer’s right to choose arbitration as a means to resolve
customer disputes fairly and efficiently, and as a critical component of
investor protection.1 Under an SEC-approved rule, broker-dealers, all of
which must be members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA),2 a securities self-regulatory organization (SRO), have an
obligation to submit to arbitration at the demand of a customer. FINRA Rule
12200 provides that member firms must arbitrate a claim if “requested by a
customer,” “[t]he dispute is between a customer and a member or associated
person of a member; and . . . [t]he dispute arises in connection with the
business activities of the member or the associated person.”3
To prevent investors from having a unilateral right to demand arbitration,
virtually all brokerage firms include provisions in their form contracts with
retail customers requiring arbitration of customers’ disputes in an SRO
forum, primarily FINRA’s Office of Dispute Resolution.4 Because the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 declares the validity, irrevocability, and
1. See Exchange Act Release No. 131, at 3, 1935 WL 29028 (Mar. 21, 1935) (immediately
after its own formation, recommending to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that it maintain
the right of customers to arbitrate disputes with NYSE firms); see also Jill I. Gross, The History of
Securities Arbitration as Investor Protection, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171 (2016) [hereinafter Gross,
The History of Securities Arbitration] (describing the history of the SEC’s support of customer’s
choice of arbitration); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal
Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 18 (2012) [hereinafter Black & Gross, Investor
Protection] (“At least since the mid-1970s the SEC has asserted the need for a nationwide investor
dispute resolution system to handle small claims and has worked with the SROs, industry
representatives and investor groups to develop arbitration rules to achieve this result.”); Sarah R.
Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional Mandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73, 79 (2005)
(“[T]he SEC has been anything but a passive bystander regarding the implementation of SRO
arbitration.”).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (2012).
3. FINRA RULE 12200.
4. See Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1179
(2010) [hereinafter Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?].
5. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)). FAA section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
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enforceability of arbitration agreements, which reflects “an emphatic federal
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,”6 courts enforce these predispute
arbitration agreements (PDAAs) strictly according to their terms.7 In 2010,
although Congress, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),8 expressly authorized the SEC to
prohibit PDAAs,9 the provision designates no deadline for action, and, as of
2016, the SEC has taken no action pursuant to this express power.10
While some scholars criticize the fairness of mandatory or “forced”11
arbitration, particularly in the consumer context,12 I have argued that FINRA
arbitration is a fair and efficient forum for the resolution of investor
disputes.13 In particular, arbitrators can decide investors’ disputes on grounds
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2. The final phrase of the section constitutes the FAA’s “savings clause,” which preserves
common law contract defenses to challenge arbitration agreements.
6. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring the FAA reflects a “national policy
favoring arbitration”).
7. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482–83 (1989)
(enforcing PDAA in a broker-dealer’s customer agreement with respect to claims arising under the
Securities Act); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon (McMahon II), 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987)
(enforcing PDAA in a broker-dealer’s customer agreement with respect to claims arising under the
Exchange Act).
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
9. Id. § 921(a) (providing that “[t]he Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions
or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or
municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal
securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if
it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and
for the protection of investors”). For the legislative history and development of this provision, see
Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, supra note 4, at 1180–83.
10. Though securities regulators currently do not ban PDAAs in customer agreements, they do
require that, if a firm inserts a PDAA in a customer agreement, it must contain particular language.
See FINRA RULE 2268.
11. Mandatory arbitration in this context means arbitration resulting from a PDAA in an
adhesive contract between parties of unequal bargaining power.
12. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers are Using
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1345
(2015) (critiquing employers’ use of mandatory arbitration to decrease employees’ access to
justice); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to
Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and
Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 988–91 (2012) (identifying fairness concerns
surrounding growth of mandatory arbitration clauses).
13. See, e.g., Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, supra note 4, at 1186; Jill I.
Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views
of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 353 (2008); Jill I. Gross,
McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
493, 499 (2008) [hereinafter Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty].
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of law, equity, and industry custom.14 Equitable bases of awards may often
favor investors, as current securities laws in many jurisdictions disfavor
investors.15
Broker-dealers, virtually all of whom are regulated by FINRA,16 also
argue that arbitration is fair to investors and have lobbied long and hard to
prevent federal regulators from prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in
customer agreements.17 It is therefore surprising that, for large-dollar-value
disputes primarily involving institutional (as opposed to individual)
investors, broker-dealers frequently resist arbitration.18 Respondent firms
sometimes thwart arbitration by contending that the claimant is not a
“customer” of the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA
Customer Code Rule 12200. This contention has fallen flat in many cases, as
courts have expanded the definition of “customer” to include not only
traditional brokerage customers, but also issuers that purchase other services
offered by broker-dealers, such as investment banking and underwriting
services.19
As a result, to avoid arbitration in multimillion-dollar disputes with
entities that qualify as “customers” under Rule 12200, some firms have
invoked forum selection clauses that had been inserted in the underlying
transaction agreements with sophisticated customers.20 Firms argue that the
14. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1047 (2002) [hereinafter Black & Gross, Making
It Up as They Go Along] (explaining multiple bases of arbitrators’ decisions).
15. Id. at 1035–40.
16. Virtually all broker-dealers are required to register with FINRA. See Exchange Act §
15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (2012).
17. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY pts. VI, VII (2007). The industry, however, announced that it will seek the repeal of Rule
12200 if the SEC bans mandatory arbitration clauses to prevent investors from having a unilateral
right to demand arbitration of customer disputes. In response, FINRA promised to fight to retain
Rule 12200 for investor protection purposes. See INV’R ADVISORY COMM., Open Meeting of the
SEC Investor Advisory Committee, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 17, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/otherwebcasts/2010/iacmeeting051710.shtml (see comments of Linda
Fienberg, the now-retired President of FINRA Dispute Resolution); see also Seminar Highlights:
Revisiting Mandatory Arbitration, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 2010, at 5, 5 (reporting that
“FINRA head Rick Ketchum has made it clear that FINRA’s rule mandating [broker-dealer]
arbitration at the demand of customers will stay, regardless of the PDAA’s fate”).
18. See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms
Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 416 (2003) (“Brokerage firms no longer find
arbitration entirely to their liking. Increasingly they turn to the courts to resist arbitration, to interfere
with ongoing arbitration, or to undo the results of arbitration.”); Forum Selection Clauses & FINRA
Rule 12200: Why Are Broker-Dealers Litigating Large-Dollar Disputes?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2014, at 1, 5.
19. See, e.g., Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Abbar, 761 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2014).
20. Additionally, the industry has threatened to make more widespread use of these clauses by
inserting them into retail customers’ agreements if the SEC bans mandatory arbitration clauses to
prevent the customers from having a unilateral right to arbitrate disputes. See Kevin Carroll, OpEd: Why Banning Mandatory Securities Arbitration Would be a Mistake, WEALTHMANAGEMENT
(May 27, 2015, 1:11 PM), http://wealthmanagement.com/commentary/op-ed-why-banningmandatory-securities-arbitration-would-be-mistake (predicting that, if the SEC banned mandatory
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clauses operate as a “waiver” of the customer’s right to demand arbitration
under Rule 12200. Those clauses—which drafting parties likely included at
a time when courts had not yet applied Rule 12200 to broker-dealers acting
in an underwriting capacity—typically provide that “all actions and
proceedings” related to disputes arising out of the agreements “shall be
brought in [a designated court].”21 The clauses examined by courts thus far
contain no reference to arbitration, whether with language of waiver or
otherwise. Rather, the agreements underlying those transactions more likely
included these types of clauses because the drafting parties assumed disputes
would be pursued in court and the clause functioned as a choice of venue
provision.
The federal appellate courts, applying contract law, currently are split on
the question of whether a forum selection clause supersedes the firms’
obligation to arbitrate.22 Some courts reason that parties can contract out of
the firms’ “default” obligation to arbitrate, and enforce the forum selection
clause as a superseding agreement.23 Other courts rule that the forum
selection clause is not specific enough to supersede the obligation to arbitrate
since the clause does not mention arbitration.24 The different outcomes reflect
the courts’ application of similar principles of contract interpretation and
arbitrability, which are difficult to reconcile.25
More fundamentally, however, I submit that recently amended section
29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), largely ignored
by the courts in this context,26 voids the parties’ forum selection clause.
Section 29(a), also known as the Exchange Act’s anti-waiver provision, voids
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization.”27
arbitration clauses in customer agreements, “[s]ome [member firms] might elect to include forum
selection clauses in their customer contracts in order to supersede the FINRA mandatory arbitration
rule, and require that all disputes be resolved in court”).
21. Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2014). For example, the
forum selection clause in City of Reno designated the District of Nevada.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See, e.g., City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 741.
24. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 2013).
25. Compare Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 214–17
(2d Cir. 2014), and City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 741–47, with Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 329–30. See
also Suleman Malik, Note, Where Do We Fight?: A Way To Resolve the Conflict Between a Forum
Selection Clause and FINRA Arbitration Rule 12200, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215, 233–
35 (2015) (arguing that FINRA Rule 12200 supersedes forum selection clauses on, inter alia,
contract law grounds).
26. One exception is a recent district court decision concluding that section 29(a) does not void
a forum selection clause because the customer did not waive a substantive right. See J.P. Morgan
Sec. LLC v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 14 Civ. 429 (PAE), 2015 WL 2452406, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May
22, 2015). The district court also inferred, based on the parties’ Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
28(j) submissions, that the Second Circuit in Golden Empire had considered section 29(a) “but did
not find it determinative.” Id. (footnote omitted).
27. Exchange Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012).
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In 2010, as part of Dodd-Frank, Congress amended section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act to include the phrase “or of any rule of a self-regulatory
organization.”28 This amendment was part of Congress’ effort to harmonize
the securities laws so that investors were as equally protected from conduct
prohibited by SROs as from conduct prohibited by securities exchanges.29
Thus, since 2010, section 29(a) explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage
agreements that require customers to waive compliance with the FINRA
rules.
If courts interpret a forum selection clause as superseding firms’ duty to
arbitrate, those courts are permitting firms to force customers to waive
compliance with their right to demand arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200.
This contradicts the SEC’s long-held position that the option to arbitrate for
retail investors is critical to maintain and protect those investors who lack
bargaining power and resources relative to broker-dealers.30 Although courts
thus far have enforced forum selection clauses only in the context of
institutional investors (rather than individuals) as customers, their rationale
could easily be expanded to individual retail investors.
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 29(a) to apply to waivers of
substantive rights arising under the Exchange Act,31 and has held that a
mandatory arbitration provision forcing customers to waive their right to
proceed in court does not violate section 29(a).32 However, broker-dealers
have no obligation under the securities laws or regulations to submit
customer disputes to court for resolution, and therefore customers are not
waiving a substantive right actionable under section 29(a).33 Is, then, the
inverse true as well: if the predispute choice of court can be waived, can the
post-dispute choice of arbitration be waived, too? In other words, is the right
to demand arbitration of a customer dispute a nonwaivable right under
section 29(a)?
This Article argues that the right to choose arbitration in the securities
industry, as a device to further investor protection, is a right that firms cannot
force investors to waive. Part I of this Article provides the statutory
framework governing broker-dealers’ agreements with their customers. Part
II describes how courts have applied this framework to forum selection
clauses in broker-dealers’ agreements with customers in recent years. Part III
argues that the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange Act bars courts from

28. Id.; see Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 927, 929T, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852, 1867
(2010).
29. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 114 (2010).
30. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
31. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon (McMahon II), 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987).
32. Id. at 234.
33. Id. at 228 (stating that the Exchange Act’s section 27, which provides federal district courts
with original jurisdiction for suits arising under the Act, “itself does not impose any duty with which
persons trading in securities must ‘comply’”).
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enforcing these forum selection clauses in the face of a customer’s choice of
arbitration.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress passed the
Exchange Act34 to protect investors from abuses in the capital markets.35 In
addition to creating the SEC as the primary federal securities regulator, the
Exchange Act also set up a system of industry self-regulation to further
protect investors and serve the public interest.36 Congress designated national
securities exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) as SROs because
they already existed as organizations that proscribed rules to govern their
members.37
A. EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 29(A)
Since its enactment, the Exchange Act has included an anti-waiver
provision. Section 29(a) originally stated that “[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of
this or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange
required, shall be void.”38
Legislative history of the original provision is scant,39 but it seems
apparent that, in 1934, Congress sought to preclude any entity or individual
from circumventing the full force of the new federal securities laws by
requiring a weaker party to waive the protections that the Act was designed
to provide for investors.40 Congress wanted to ensure that securities firms did
not exert their market power on investors by contracting around their new

34. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–
78pp (2012)).
35. See NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §
1.01 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2015) (explaining that the broker-dealer “industry is highly regulated
because of its economic importance” and the “possibility of investor abuse”).
36. See id. § 4.01, at 4-3.
37. See id. § 4.01[C], at 4-9.
38. Exchange Act § 29(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)).
39. Section 29(a) “was taken verbatim out of the [S]ecurities [A]ct.” Stock Exchange Practices:
Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d
Cong. (1934), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 7421, 6568 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 2001).
The legislative history of the parallel provision, section 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n,
is silent as to the statute’s scope. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to
Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 127 n.237
(1985).
40. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through The Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 402–03 (1987) (arguing that Congress included
antiwaiver clauses such as section 29(a) in federal securities laws to reverse the common law’s
enforcement of brokers’ predispute waivers of statutory liability).
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statutory duties and obligations. Firms could not accomplish via contract
what the regulations prohibited them from doing.41
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the anti-waiver provision by
striking “an exchange required thereby” and inserting “a self-regulatory
organization.”42 Thus, section 29(a) now explicitly invalidates provisions in
brokerage agreements that require customers to waive compliance with
FINRA rules, whereas before Dodd-Frank, the express language of the statute
appeared to apply to waivers of rules of only securities exchanges.
The animating purpose of the 2010 amendment to section 29(a) is as
mysterious as the origin of the section itself. The section in Dodd-Frank
containing the amendment bore the heading “Equal Treatment of SelfRegulatory Organization Rules.”43 The Senate Report for the amendment
states its purpose was to “provide[] equal treatment for the rules of all SROs
under Section 29(a).”44 Congress wanted to harmonize the securities laws so
that rules of all SROs have equal force to those of exchanges (which are also
SROs), so as to maximize investor protection. This made sense in an era in
which FINRA had gained power and prestige as a securities regulator, and
reached all broker-dealers, unlike the exchanges, which could regulate only
its members, a far smaller subset of broker-dealers.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the anti-waiver provision in the
context of a mandatory arbitration clause in a broker-dealer’s customer’s
account agreement. In 1987, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,45 the Supreme Court held that, contrary to the thirty-year-old
precedent from Wilko v. Swan,46 the anti-waiver provision did not render a
PDAA unenforceable with respect to federal securities claims.
Eugene and Julia McMahon were investors who alleged that their broker
engaged in fraud and excessive trading in their brokerage account. The
McMahons’ opening account agreement contained an arbitration provision
covering “any controversy arising out of or relating to [their] accounts,”47 but
41. See AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 183 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Section 29(a) is not
intended to protect substantive rights created by contract. It is designed to protect rights created by
the Exchange Act, and it expressly forecloses contracting parties from ‘defin[ing] the boundaries of
the[ir] transaction’ in a way that relieves a party of the duties imposed by that Act . . . .”).
42. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 927, 929T, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012).
43. See id. § 927 (“Equal Treatment of Self-Regulatory Organization Rules. Section 29(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)) is amended by striking ‘an exchange
required thereby’ and inserting ‘a self-regulatory organization.’”).
44. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 114 (2010).
45. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon (McMahon II), 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (holding
that section 29(a) did not void a PDAA in a customer agreement with respect to claims under the
Exchange Act); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482–83
(1989) (holding that anti-waiver clause of the Securities Act of 1933 did not void a PDAA in a
customer agreement with respect to claims arising under that Act).
46. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Court did not technically overrule Wilko until
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
47. McMahon II, 482 U.S. at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McMahon v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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they resisted arbitration on the grounds that the clause was inapplicable to
claims arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). After the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the Exchange Act claims were not
arbitrable under Wilko and section 29(a),48 the brokerage firm appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit, divining the antiwaiver provision’s central purpose: “Section 29(a) is concerned, not with
whether brokers ‘manuever[ed customers] into’ an agreement, but with
whether the agreement ‘weaken[s] [customers’] ability to recover under the
[Exchange] Act.’”49 It then rejected the McMahons’ first argument that
section 29(a) voided the McMahons’ PDAA because it was an agreement that
waived compliance with Exchange Act section 27. That section provides:
“[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder.”50 The Court
reasoned:
What the antiwaiver provision of § 29(a) forbids is enforcement of
agreements to waive “compliance” with the provisions of the statute. But §
27 itself does not impose any duty with which persons trading in securities
must “comply.” By its terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the
substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act. Because § 27 does
not impose any statutory duties, its waiver does not constitute a waiver of
“compliance with any provision” of the Exchange Act under § 29(a).51

Thus, the Court suggests that “substantive obligations” under the Exchange
Act that cannot be waived are provisions that impose a duty on a regulated
entity.52
In rejecting the McMahons’ second argument that their “arbitration
agreement effects an impermissible waiver of the substantive protections of
the Exchange Act” because it resulted from broker overreaching,53 the Court
repeated a phrase it first penned two years earlier when deciding the
48. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. (McMahon I), 788 F.2d 94, 96–98 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev’d, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
49. McMahon II, 482 U.S. at 230 (alterations in original) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
432 (1953)).
50. Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
51. McMahon II, 482 U.S. at 228.
52. Id.; see also Black & Gross, Investor Protection, supra note 1, at 20 (“The investor
protections afforded by the statute and its rules are so important that Congress would not permit
parties to negotiate deals that weakened the statutory framework. While the congressional purpose
may have been at least partly protective, reflecting a concern that the more sophisticated party might
persuade the less sophisticated party to give up his rights, Congress also must have been concerned
about the national interest and the importance of federal regulation for the overall fairness and
effectiveness of the securities markets.”).
53. McMahon II, 482 U.S. at 229.

392

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 10

arbitrability of an antitrust claim arising under the Sherman Act: “[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.”54 This phrase seems to suggest that the
selection of a forum is merely a procedural choice, not a substantive one.
However, the Court continued: “[t]he voluntariness of the agreement is
irrelevant to this inquiry: if a stipulation waives compliance with a statutory
duty, it is void under § 29(a), whether voluntary or not.”55 Again, the Court
focused on finding a nonwaivable protection in a statutory duty.
Subsequent to McMahon, lower courts have interpreted section 29(a) to
bar provisions that weaken investors’ ability to recover under the federal
securities laws, no matter what form they take: “non-reliance” clauses in
stock purchase or other acquisition agreements,56 “no-action” clauses in
indentures,57 prospective liability waivers,58 or clauses that specify
indemnification as the sole remedy.59 Conversely, courts have found that
provisions that do not weaken an investor’s ability to recover under federal
securities (or equivalent) laws are not voided by section 29(a).60 Only one
54. Id. at 229–30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
55. Id. at 230.
56. See, e.g., Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (synthetic trading
relationship); AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003); Universal Am. Corp. v.
Partners Healthcare Sols. Holdings, L.P., 61 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D. Del. 2014) (merger agreement);
MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ’g. Co., No. 01-C-177-C, 2001 WL 1478812
(W.D. Wis. Sept. 6, 2001); Roll v. Singh, No. 07-CV-04136(FLW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50125
(D.N.J. June 26, 2008). Some courts have enforced nonreliance clauses in negotiated contracts
among sophisticated investors or corporate insiders where the written agreement contains specific
representations and the nonreliance clause serves the purpose of barring representations not
contained in the agreement. See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that plaintiff’s remedies were weakened, but emphasizing that this was a detailed
written agreement negotiated among sophisticated parties); Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th
Cir. 2000) (no discussion of section 29(a)); see also Harborview Master Fund, LP v. Lightpath
Techs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 537, 547 n.8, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling that “big boy” clause in
contract between sophisticated parties did not violate section 29(a)).
57. See, e.g., McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995).
58. See, e.g., Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 545 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not give effect
to contractual language, such as the language here, purporting to be a general waiver or release of
Rule 10b-5 liability altogether.”); Valentini v. Citigroup, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 304, 317–18
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“We cannot give effect to contractual provisions that amount to a general waiver
of liability under § 10(b).”) (citing Vacold, 545 F.3d at 122); Dresner v. Utility.com, Inc., 371 F.
Supp. 2d 476, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (voiding releases that “purported prospectively to waive
plaintiffs’ rights to pursue causes of action of which they were not yet aware”).
59. Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int’l Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007(GBD), 2003 WL 1797847, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003).
60. See, e.g., Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of
Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360–63 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that section 29(a) does not void a choiceof-law clause designating English law and an English forum for investors’ claims arising out of
contracts for underwriting capital between Lloyd’s of London and U.S. residents because these were
international transactions among sophisticated investors and available English remedies provided
investors with adequate alternatives); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc) (holding that section 29(a) does not void choice of forum and choice of law
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lower court has directly addressed whether section 29(a) bars a forum
selection clause from superseding a broker-dealer’s duty to arbitrate.61
The following section describes the provision of the Exchange Act that
authorizes the SEC to monitor SROs and their dispute resolution programs
to ensure protection of investors.
B. EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 15A
In 1938, Congress amended the Exchange Act to authorize the
registration of nonexchange, national securities associations as SROs to
regulate brokers in the over-the-counter market.62 FINRA—now the largest
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United
States—is the only registered national securities association under section
15A of the Exchange Act.63
In 1975, Congress again amended the Exchange Act, this time to give the
SEC broad new powers over all SROs, including the power to review all of
their proposed rules and to require them to adopt, change, or repeal any
rules.64 Through this power, the SEC exercises oversight of FINRA’s
activities, including operation of its arbitration forum, the largest dispute
resolution forum in the securities industry.65 The Exchange Act requires
FINRA to adopt rules that may be designed for a variety of purposes, ranging
from preventing “fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” to
promoting “just and equitable principles of trade,” and “in general,
[protecting] investors and the public interest.”66
FINRA must file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and, before
approving them, the SEC must publish notice and provide interested persons
an opportunity to comment on the proposals.67 The SEC can approve
FINRA’s rules, after a public comment period, if it finds they are consistent
with the requirements of the Exchange Act and are designed to protect
investors and the public interest.68 In addition, the SEC may, on its own
provisions because English law provided “adequate substitutes” for federal securities laws); Lipcon
v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing it is a
“close question,” but following the “weight of circuit authority”).
61. See J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 14 Civ. 429 (PAE), 2015 WL 2452406,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2015).
62. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 35, § 4.01[C], at 4-9.
63. About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2016).
64. Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012). See generally POSER & FANTO, supra note 35,
§ 4.04[A], at 4-33.
65. Arbitration
and
Mediation,
FIN.
INDUS.
REGULATORY
AUTH.,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
66. Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6). The statute also lists certain
improper purposes, including regulating “matters not related to the purposes of [the Act].” Id.
67. Id. § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). Conversely, the SEC must disapprove a proposed rule
change if it does not make the requisite finding. Id. § 19(b)(2)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C)(ii).
68. Id. §§ 15A(b)(6), 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(6), 78s(b)(2).
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initiative, amend FINRA’s rules as it deems “necessary or appropriate . . . in
furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act].”69
The SEC has long viewed the option of securities arbitration for investors
as an important component of its investor protection mandate. Indeed, since
its creation, the SEC has urged the SROs it regulates to provide an alternative
dispute resolution forum for customers.70 In the mid-1970s, the SEC
proclaimed the need for a nationwide investor dispute resolution system to
handle small claims and worked with the SROs, industry representatives, and
investor groups to develop arbitration rules to achieve that result.71 In the
1980s, the SEC filed several amicus briefs with courts expressing its strong
support for SRO arbitration, as long as the forums followed SEC-approved
arbitration procedures and enforced all SRO rules designed to protect
investors.72
The SEC intensified its oversight of securities arbitration after
McMahon, when SRO arbitration became the principal forum for resolving
customers’ disputes with their brokers.73 Likewise, since McMahon, FINRA
has engaged in ongoing review and reform of its arbitration rules74 “for the
continued improvement of securities industry arbitration as a fair,
expeditious, and economical means for the resolution of disputes.”75 Among
other things, the SEC now prohibits FINRA member firms from “having
agreements with customers that limit or contradict the rules of any SRO or

69. Id. § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
70. See Exchange Act Release No. 131, at 3–4, 1935 WL 29028 (Mar. 21, 1935).
71. Order Approving NYSE, NASD, and ASE Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the

Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,145
(May 16, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Approval Order] (describing how the SROs have worked for the
past twelve years to develop uniform arbitration rules through the Securities Industry Conference
on Arbitration (SICA), which was formed at the SEC’s invitation to review arbitration procedures
as alternatives to the SEC’s own proposals).
72. See, e.g., Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44), 1986 WL
727882, at *17 (“The Commission has exercised this new authority [over SRO rules] since 1975 in
several ways specifically designed to promote fair and effective arbitral forums for the resolution
of disputes between customers and SRO-member brokerage firms.”); Brief of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Roney & Co. v. Goren, No. 88-1874, at 21 (2d Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter Brief of the SEC in Roney] (on file with author) (emphasizing that “McMahon
demonstrates the importance of enforcing compliance with SRO rules governing arbitration
between SRO members and their customers”).
73. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 13, at 514 (describing how the SEC staff, after
McMahon, recommended numerous rule changes to make arbitration fairer and more neutral).
74. See Black & Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along, supra note 14, at 999–1005 (describing
post-McMahon reforms); Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 13, at 514–17 (describing
SEC’s robust oversight of FINRA’s arbitration process and FINRA’s frequent reforms of its codes
of arbitration procedure).
75. NASD Notice to Members, 89-21 Proposed Amendment Re: Predispute Arbitration Clauses
in
Customer
Agreements,
FIN.
INDUS.
REGULATORY
AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=1404
(last
visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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limit the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration. . . .”76 The approval
order for this provision explained that one of its purposes was to prevent
member firms from “limit[ing] SRO forums otherwise available to parties.”77
The next section discusses the FINRA rule that imposes a duty on brokerdealers to offer investors an arbitration forum.
C. FINRA RULE 12200: CUSTOMERS’ RIGHT TO DEMAND
ARBITRATION
FINRA’s rules impose a duty on its member firms and their associated
persons to arbitrate a dispute at the demand of a customer, even in the absence
of an arbitration agreement. Under current FINRA Rule 12200, a FINRA
member firm must arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,”78 “[t]he
dispute is between a customer and a member or associated person of a
member; and . . . [t]he dispute arises in connection with the business activities
of the member or the associated person.”79 Moreover, FINRA declares that it
may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade and a violation of [FINRA Conduct] Rule 2010 for a member or a
person associated with a member to: . . . fail to submit a dispute to arbitration
under the [FINRA Arbitration] Code as required by the Code.80

Thus, FINRA deems this right worthy of enforcing through disciplinary
action.
As a threshold issue, because FINRA does not define “customer,” courts
have struggled to come up with a precise definition. While FINRA member
firms historically have acknowledged that investors with brokerage accounts
were “customers” within the meaning of Rule 12200, those firms challenged
arbitration proceedings brought by others who did not have accounts, but had
purchased other types of financial services from broker-dealers. Some circuit
courts have concluded that a customer is “a non-broker and non-dealer who
purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in the course of
the member’s FINRA-regulated business activities.”81 More recently, after

76. FINRA RULE 2268(d)(1)–(2); see also 1989 Approval Order, supra note 71, at 21,154.
77. 1989 Approval Order, supra note 71, at 21,154.
78. FINRA does not define “customer,” except for its mention in Rule 12100(i) (a “customer

shall not include a broker or dealer”). Courts continue to refine the definition of the term “customer”
under FINRA Rule 12200. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
79. FINRA RULE 12200.
80. FINRA RULE IM-12000.
81. Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
the municipality that issued auction-rate securities (ARS) qualified as the firm’s “customer” because
the firm “served as the underwriter for the 2005 and 2006 Bonds and as the broker-dealer for . . .
ARS auctions,” “sold Reno interest rate swaps to protect the financing structure,” “acted as Reno’s
agent in dealing with the rating agencies,” and “conducted discussions with bond insurers on Reno’s
behalf”).
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reviewing a long line of prior Second Circuit decisions on the subject,82 the
Second Circuit refined “the precise boundaries of the FINRA meaning of
‘customer,’” and ruled that “a ‘customer’ under FINRA Rule 12200 is one
who, while not a broker or dealer, either (1) purchases a good or service from
a FINRA member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA member.”83
Significantly, this duty to arbitrate upon the demand of a customer has
been imposed on brokerage firms since the 1800s.84 In the mid-1800s, the
Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock and Exchange Board (the
Board), the predecessor to the New York Stock Exchange, accepted
jurisdiction over nonmember customer disputes with member firms.85 The
Board did this to ensure that nonmembers—that is, investors—trusted the
Board and had confidence in its member brokers to conduct themselves
honestly. As one scholar studying this history observed: “The Board cited
this nonmember edge with some pride in its dealings with the outside world.
Investors had more assurance of the honesty of members than other brokers,
it argued, because members were aware of how much easier it would be to
force them to comply with their contracts.”86
In 1869, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) amended its constitution
to expressly provide to investors the right to demand arbitration of disputes
with its member firms, even in the absence of a PDAA.87 Archival records
indicate that investor protection goals animated the NYSE’s grant of this
right.88

82. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d
164 (2d Cir. 2011); UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 2011).
83. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Abbar, 761 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that a
Saudi businessman who managed family trusts that lost $383 million invested with a UK affiliate
of Citigroup, Inc. was not a “customer” of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (Citi NY) under Rule
12200 because he purchased no goods or services from Citi NY and had no account with it, and thus
could not compel Citi NY to arbitrate the dispute).
84. For a more complete history of the customer’s right to demand arbitration of a securities
firm, see Gross, The History of Securities Arbitration, supra note 1.
85. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 272–73 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
86. Id. at 273.
87. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, CONST. ART. III
(1869) (establishing an “Arbitration Committee, to consist of nine members, whose duty it shall be
to investigate and decide all claims and matters of difference arising between members of the
Exchange; they shall also adjudicate such claims as may be preferred against members by nonmembers, when such non-members shall agree to abide by the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange, in such cases provided”); Id. BY-LAWS ART. LII (“Any person not a member of the
Exchange shall have the right to bring a claim arising from any transaction against a member of said
Exchange, before the Arbitration Committee . . . .”); Norman S. Poser, Making Securities
Arbitration Work, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1996) (“The NYSE Constitution of 1869 not only
provided for arbitration of ‘all claims and matters of difference’ between members but also gave
non-members the right to arbitrate disputes with members if they agreed to abide by the rules of the
Exchange.”).
88. See Gross, The History of Securities Arbitration, supra note 1, at 179.
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In 1935, the SEC recognized this right just after its own formation, when
it gained regulatory authority over the exchanges.89 In a memorandum to the
NYSE, the Chairman of the SEC stated: “[t]he right to arbitration before the
arbitration committee of the exchange is at present granted to any customer
regardless of the contract between the member and the customer.”90 To
address its concerns regarding the composition and neutrality of arbitration
panels for those customer arbitrations, the SEC recommended to the NYSE
that it maintain this right for customers, but also provide an option for
arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals rather than just before the
NYSE.91 Though renumbered as various provisions over the years, the right
ultimately found its home in NYSE Constitution Art. XI and NYSE
Arbitration Rule 600(a).92
In 1972, FINRA’s predecessor, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), which had started an arbitration program in 1969, adopted
an identical rule—which ultimately became (now-retired) NASD Rule 10301
and (then) FINRA Rule 12200—providing the same right to customers who
have disputes with NASD member firms and their associated persons.93
When it first proposed the rule to its members, NASD explained that it had
gained the necessary experience of running an arbitration program, and
sought to establish a uniform dispute resolution system for industry-related
disputes by adopting a rule identical to NYSE Rule 600.94 In its notice to
members, the NASD offered four reasons for seeking this rule change:
89. See Exchange Act Release No. 131, at 3, 1935 WL 29028 (Mar. 21, 1935). In the
memorandum, the SEC set forth its views on a variety of arbitration and nonarbitration issues as
part of a review of the NYSE’s rules and procedures.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. (“Since the customer can at any time prior to arbitration choose to seek his remedy in the
courts, continued maintenance of this policy possesses no disadvantage, provided that the Exchange
also encourages arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals as an additional remedy available
to customers.”). The NYSE did not follow this recommendation.
92. NYSE Rule 600(a) provided:
Any dispute, claim or controversy between a customer or non-member and a
member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person,
arising in connection with the business of such member, allied member,
member organization and/or associated person, in connection with his
activities as an associated person shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and
Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. as provided by any duly executed
and enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of the customer or nonmember.
NYSE RULE 600(a). This clause of the NYSE Constitution has been described as “the most
significant of the measures taken to implement the self-regulation contemplated by the 1934 Act.”
Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972).
93. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Notice to Members, Proposed Amendments to By-Laws,
Rules of Fair Practice and the Code of Arbitration Procedure, at 1 (July 23, 1971).
94. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Special Report to NASD Members (Dec. 1970) (seeking
“advice and suggestions of members” on proposal to adopt a type of mandatory arbitration at NASD
“similar to that in use by the exchanges” requiring member firms to arbitrate at the request of a
“professional or member of the public”).
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1. Arbitration provides a more expedient means of settling disputes than
litigation. If a mandatory arbitration program exists, a firm can enter into a
contract with more confidence, realizing that most disputes can be settled
without tying up capital for long periods of time.
2. Mandatory arbitration costs a fraction of the expense needed to settle
disputes in the courts.
3. Arbitrators are chosen because of their immediate familiarity with the
securities business.
4. Mandatory arbitration under NASD rules would make procedures within
the industry more uniform to provide an equal opportunity to settle
disputes.95

When the NYSE merged its enforcement and arbitration functions with
the NASD in 2007,96 NYSE Rule 600 was consolidated with NASD 10301
into today’s FINRA Rule 12200. Thus, for almost 200 years, customers have
had the right to demand arbitration of a dispute with a NYSE member firm,
and since 1972 with every broker-dealer in the country.
Despite this time-honored right, brokerage firms now contend that they
can force customers to waive that right via forum selection clauses. The next
Part discusses whether courts have endorsed that argument.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON WHETHER RULE 12200 IS
WAIVABLE
The circuit courts are currently split on whether the duty to arbitrate
under FINRA Rule 12200 is waivable. Both the Second and Ninth Circuit
have refused to compel a broker-dealer to arbitrate under Rule 12200 on the
grounds that a forum selection clause in the disputants’ agreements
superseded the firm’s duty to arbitrate.97 These courts rejected an opposite
95. Id.
96. Until mid-2007, the NASD and the NYSE ran separate arbitration forums that handled a

combined ninety-nine percent of all securities arbitrations in the country. On July 30, 2007, NASD
and NYSE Regulation, including their respective arbitration forums, consolidated and formed
FINRA. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD and NYSE Member Regulation
Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority – FINRA (July 30, 2007). FINRA
now operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry. See Arbitration and
Mediation, supra note 65.
97. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2014)
(reasoning that Rule 12200 was a “default” agreement to arbitrate that was trumped by the laterexecuted agreement—the forum selection clause); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d
733 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the City of Reno, which had retained Goldman, Sachs for
advisory and underwriting services in connection with its issuance of auction-rate securities to
finance a series of city projects, was a “customer” under FINRA Rule 12200); Credit Suisse Sec.
(USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that “more specific” forum selection
clause trumped the duty to arbitrate a member’s dispute with its employee under FINRA Rule
13200). Cf. Presbyterian Health Care Servs. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. CIV 14-0181 JB/SCY,
2015 WL 4993571 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015) (enforcing a forum selection clause against customer
of FINRA member that sought arbitration of claims and granting motion to transfer venue of claims
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holding by the Fourth Circuit.98 To the extent these courts considered section
29(a) at all, they rejected the argument that the anti-waiver provision applies
to the duty to arbitrate.
The Second Circuit’s decision is instructive; in a single opinion, it
resolved two cases: Goldman, Sachs & Company v. Golden Empire School
Financing Authority, and Citigroup Global Markets. Inc. v. North Carolina
Eastern Municipal Power Agency.99 In the first case, Golden Empire Schools
Financing Authority and Kern High School District issued approximately
$125 million of auction-rate securities (ARS) in 2004, 2006, and 2007, for
which Goldman Sachs was an underwriter and broker-dealer.100 In the second
case, the North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (NCEMPA)
retained Citigroup Global Markets Inc. as its underwriter and broker-dealer
for the issuance of $223 million of ARS.101 In both cases, the issuers claimed
that the member firms fraudulently induced them to issue their respective
ARS.102
For each issuance, the parties executed an underwriter agreement and a
broker-dealer agreement. While the underwriting agreements were silent as
to dispute resolution, the broker-dealer agreements contained forum selection
clauses that required “all actions and proceedings” related to the transactions
between the parties be “brought in the United States District Court in the
County of New York.”103
In 2012, Golden Empire commenced a FINRA arbitration, alleging that
Goldman Sachs fraudulently induced it to issue the ARS. In the same year,
NCEMPA brought a similar FINRA arbitration against Citigroup. In both
cases, the member firm sought to enjoin the FINRA arbitration on the
grounds that the forum selection clause superseded its duty to arbitrate under
Rule 12200.104 The issuers responded that, because they were “customers” of
a FINRA member firm, the firm had a duty to arbitrate the dispute under
FINRA Rule 12200.105
The Second Circuit held that the forum selection clause superseded
FINRA’s mandatory arbitration rule.106 The court reasoned that Rule 12200
for transferee court to determine whether Rule 12200 supersedes forum selection clause). For a
more detailed discussion of City of Reno, see Jill I. Gross & Olivia Darius, Arbitration Case Law
Update 2014, in PRACTISING LAW INST., SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2014 COURSEBOOK 277, 296–
97 (2014). For a more detailed discussion of Golden Empire, see Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Case Law
Update 2015, in PRACTISING LAW INST., SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2015 COURSEBOOK 45, 60–61
(2015).
98. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2013).
99. Golden Empire, 764 F.3d 210.
100. Id. at 212.
101. Id. at 212–13.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 214.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 217.
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was a “default” agreement to arbitrate that was trumped by the later-executed
agreement—the forum selection clause.107 Additionally, the court explained
that the underwriting agreement contained a merger clause and thus the
earlier agreement under Rule 12200 merged into the forum selection
clause.108
Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit case, Goldman, Sachs & Company v. City
of Reno, the court concluded that the City of Reno, which had retained
Goldman Sachs for advisory and underwriting services in connection with its
issuance of ARS to finance a series of city projects, was a “customer” under
FINRA Rule 12200.109 However, as in Golden Empire, the court also
concluded that the city had waived its right to arbitrate under FINRA Rule
12200 because it had agreed to a forum selection clause in its 2005 and 2006
agreements with Goldman Sachs.110
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion
Clinic held that the forum selection clause at issue was not specific enough
to supersede Rule 12200 because it did not specifically mention
“arbitration.”111 Rather, the court interpreted “all actions and proceedings” to
apply only to litigations, not arbitrations.112 The court noted that interpreting
“all actions and proceedings” to include arbitrations would necessarily lead
to the conclusion that the parties intended an “arbitration” to be brought in
the district court, a nonsensical result.113
I believe the Second and Ninth Circuits—in Golden Empire and City of
Reno, respectively—incorrectly interpreted Rule 12200. A fundamental
premise to their rulings—that I believe is flawed—is that Rule 12200 is a
written agreement to arbitrate required by the FAA that somehow is executed
before the parties entered into the underwriting agreements. However, the
duty to arbitrate arose at the exact same time as the execution of the
agreements establishing the broker-customer relationship. And, as I see it,
the duty to arbitrate is ongoing—at any time a customer can invoke Rule
107. Id. at 215. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding that a “more specific” forum selection clause trumped the duty to arbitrate a member’s
dispute with its employee under FINRA Rule 13200).
108. Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 216.
109. Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2014).
110. Id. at 743–47. The clause at issue designated the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada. Id. at 736–37.
111. The clause at issue provided:
The parties agree that all actions and proceedings arising out of this
Agreement or any of the transactions contemplated hereby shall be brought in
the United States District Court in the County of New York. To the extent
permitted by law, each of the parties hereto also irrevocably waives all right
to trial by jury in any action, proceeding or counterclaim arising out of this
Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby.
UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 330.
113. Id.
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12200 and request a FINRA member firm to arbitrate a dispute. At the time
the customer invokes the right by filing a Statement of Claim with FINRA
initiating the arbitration, the customer is required to execute and file a
submission agreement with the forum. When the member firm files an answer
to the customer’s claim, the firm must also execute and file a submission
agreement. Those agreements signify the written agreements to arbitrate
between the customer and member firm; not Rule 12200 itself.114
But, even if the forum selection clause can be seen as a later-executed
agreement superseding a prior agreement to arbitrate, I believe section 29(a)
of the Exchange Act voids that clause. The next Part explains why.
III. SECTION 29(A) APPLIES TO FINRA RULE 12200
Customers’ right to compel a FINRA member to arbitrate disputes
arising out of the business of their accounts is a nonwaivable right for
investors and an obligation with which broker-dealers must comply. Under
section 29(a)’s plain meaning, as recently amended by Dodd-Frank, any
clause in a brokerage agreement that purports to waive the firm’s compliance
with any FINRA conduct or arbitration rule is void. The section does not
distinguish between conduct or arbitration rules; all SRO rules are
included.115 The section also does not distinguish among the types of
“persons” it covers: it protects retail customers as well as institutional
investors; the relative sophistication of the “person” is not relevant.
In addition, McMahon dictates that agreements that purport to waive
regulated entities’ duties to comply with Exchange Act regulations are void.
The SEC acknowledges that Rule 12200 creates a duty—an obligation of
regulated firms under the Exchange Act.116 Furthermore, lower courts
interpreting Rule 12200 and its predecessors describe the rule as providing a
right to the customer and imposing an obligation on the broker-dealer.117
114. In any event, I also agree that a forum selection clause must mention arbitration for it to be
specific enough to trump a statutory duty to arbitrate.
115. Since 1975, the SEC has had to approve all SRO rules, including arbitration rules, to ensure
they fulfill the purposes of the statute and SEC’s implementing regulations. See Gross, McMahon
Turns Twenty, supra note 13, at 512 (“The 1975 amendments added an indispensable layer of
statutory regulation over SRO arbitration with the express statutory purpose of enhancing investor
protection.”).
116. See Exchange Act Release No. 131, at 4, 1935 WL 29028 (Mar. 21, 1935) (“The right to
arbitration before the arbitration committee of the exchange is at present granted to any customer
regardless of the contract between the member and the customer.”) (emphasis added); see also 1989
Approval Order, supra note 71, at 21,154 (reiterating the SEC’s position that SRO rules barring
firms from including in their agreements any condition that “limit[s] or contradict[s] the rule of any
SRO” applies to clauses in agreements used to “limit SRO forums otherwise available to parties”).
117. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 321 (“[W]e conclude that . . . the forum selection clause relied
on by UBS and Citi did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion’s right to arbitrate.”);
Pershing, L.L.C. v. Bevis, 606 F. App’x 754, 755 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Because of Pershing’s FINRA
membership, its customers have the right to compel Pershing to arbitrate their disputes under
FINRA Rule 12200.”); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that “forum selection clauses superseded Goldman’s default obligation to arbitrate under
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Applying section 29(a) to purported waivers of Rule 12200 is consistent
with Congress’ purpose of including anti-waiver provisions in its laws: to
preclude private parties from leveraging their bargaining power to contract
for something that the law otherwise prohibits.118 Congress created
obligations under the Exchange Act—or delegated to the SEC the authority
to create such obligations—and blocked persons from contracting around
them. In other words, agreements cannot thwart the intention of Congress.119
As the SEC put it: “[i]f broker-dealers are allowed to avoid the application of
SRO arbitration rules by enforcing conflicting provisions written into
customer contracts, the customer protections afforded by those rules and the
SRO arbitration system will be undermined and investor confidence in the
system will be eroded.”120
The SEC insists on the maintenance of the securities arbitration system
precisely because it is fair to investors and provides a more hospitable forum
than the court for the resolution of their disputes.121 The SEC also recognizes
that if investors cannot pursue their small-dollar-value claims in arbitration,
they likely will have no forum in which to pursue them, as a court is not
hospitable to such small claims.122 Enforcing “[t]he principle of customer
choice upon which the SRO arbitration system is grounded serves the
Commission’s goal of assuring that the most efficient and economical
arbitration forum for a particular case will be available to the customer.”123
Likewise, FINRA insists on providing investors with the right to demand
the FINRA Rules” and “that . . . Reno disclaimed any right it might otherwise have had to the
FINRA arbitration forum”).
118. See Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 824 (2009) (“Congress [through section 29(a)] would not permit parties
to negotiate deals that weakened the statutory framework. While the congressional purpose may
have been at least partly protective, reflecting a concern that the more sophisticated party might
persuade the less sophisticated party to give up his rights, Congress also must have been concerned
about the national interest and the importance of federal regulation for the overall fairness and
effectiveness of the securities market—the fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act.”).
119. “When a self-regulatory association of securities firms, under direct federal supervision,
ordains that its members may not require their employees to waive arbitration rights, it would be
inappropriate for us to enforce such a waiver.” Thomas James Assocs., Inc. v. Jameson, 102 F.3d
60, 66 (2d Cir. 1996) (voiding employee’s waiver of right to arbitrate disputes with employer
FINRA-member as against public policy). But see Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, No. 14
Civ. 8568(NRB), 2015 WL 170241, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015) (declining to void provision in
employment agreement calling for arbitration at JAMS rather than FINRA and stating that
“[r]espondents are in a different position from the employee in Jameson because the Credit Suisse
EDRP does not waive the right to arbitration; it merely waives the right to FINRA’s arbitral forum.
In contrast to the clear federal policy favoring arbitration, there is no basis to conclude that federal
policy favors FINRA’s forum over JAMS (or the American Arbitration Association)”), aff’d, 812
F.3d 249, 2016 WL 336190 (2d Cir. 2016).
120. Brief of the SEC in Roney, supra note 72, at 4.
121. See Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, supra note 4, at 1186–89 (listing
the ways in which SRO arbitration rules ensure the protection of investors).
122. Brief of the SEC in Roney, supra note 72, at 10–11 (describing history of and reasons for
SEC’s development of an affordable forum for investors to pursue small claims).
123. Id. at 16.
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arbitration because it believes that arbitration is a “faster, cheaper and less
complex” method of resolving customer disputes than court.124 And, the
industry itself touts securities arbitration as offering “significant benefits to
parties that are not available in court.”125
McMahon’s ruling that firms can force customers to waive the right to
litigate and not run afoul of section 29(a) should not be extended to the right
to arbitrate. Nowhere do the federal securities laws require member firms to
litigate customer disputes; FINRA regulations only require particular
language in a PDAA if firms do force customers to waive the right to proceed
in court. McMahon was concerned with the different question of whether
forcing customers to waive their right to go to court weakens their ability to
recover under the Exchange Act. Since the Court concluded the heavily
regulated system of securities arbitration provided an adequate forum to
resolve disputes, investors were protected. Moreover, the Court in McMahon
had no occasion to consider whether depriving investors of the arbitration
forum weakened their ability to recover under the Exchange Act.
Lower courts’ focus post-McMahon on whether a waiver addresses
substantive or procedural rights misreads the scope of section 29(a), which
does not use the word “substantive.” Congress made the section applicable
to “any condition, stipulation, or provision” that forces a person to “waive
compliance with any provision” of the Exchange Act, or “any rule of a selfregulatory organization.”126 Moreover, “[t]he words ‘substantive’ and
‘procedural’ or ‘remedial’ are not talismanic. Merely calling a legal question
by one or the other does not resolve it otherwise than as a purely authoritarian
performance.”127 Rather, courts should examine whether the challenged
agreement permits a regulated entity from avoiding compliance with its
regulatory obligations.128
Finally, not permitting broker-dealers to force customers to waive their
right to arbitration is consistent with the “emphatic federal policy favoring
arbitral dispute resolution.”129 While scholars continue to challenge PDAAs
in consumer and employment agreements as forcing an unfair arbitration
process on weaker disputants,130 securities arbitration is different because it
124. See Arbitration and Mediation: Overview, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/overview (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
125. Securities Arbitration System, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance & Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th
Cong. 67 (2005) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n).
126. Exchange Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012).
127. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 115 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
128. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon (McMahon II), 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987).
129. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S.Ct. 23, 25 (2011).
130. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 316–20
(2015) (critiquing mandatory arbitration clauses); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory
Consumer Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133 (2004) (arguing that arbitration is
“unavailable to many consumers because its cost is too great”); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory
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is regulated. Congress has delegated the regulation of the securities industry
to the SEC, and the SEC has a strong policy favoring arbitration of investor
disputes. Thus, the right of the investor to choose arbitration should not be
waivable.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange
Act prohibits broker-dealers from invoking forum selection clauses in
agreements to supersede their duty to arbitrate customer disputes if the
customer wants arbitration. Courts and litigants have largely ignored this
argument in cases involving the collision between FINRA Rule 12200 and a
forum selection clause. Ignoring this argument, however, deprives investors
of the dispute processing choice granted to them by securities regulators. As
discussed above, offering the dispute resolution process choice of arbitration
to retail investors has been a long-standing policy of the SROs and the SEC.
Advocating for arbitration in the securities industry might appear to some
as contradictory to the current narrative of consumer arbitration as
undesirable.131 In my view, much of the criticism of consumer arbitration
does not apply equally to securities arbitration, as the system is regulated and
has many investor-protective features.132 In any event, this Article does not
address whether mandatory arbitration is desirable or undesirable. Rather, it
aims to preserve arbitration as a process choice for investors. The equitable
features of arbitration provide investors with a compelling alternative to
courts today, particularly in light of the anti-investor bent of court holdings
in recent decades. Congress has made it clear that investors must be
protected; one way to protect investors is to prohibit waivers of obligations
established by the Exchange Act; and submission to the investor’s choice of
arbitration is an obligation of an SRO regulation promulgated pursuant to the
Exchange Act. Broker-dealers cannot supplant that choice with forum
selection clauses.

Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 90 (2014)
(“[R]ather than enhancing equality, mandatory arbitration exacerbates inequality in access to justice
in the workplace.”); Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1312 (critiquing employers’ use of mandatory
arbitration to decrease employees’ access to justice); Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 988–91
(identifying fairness concerns surrounding the growth of mandatory arbitration clauses).
131. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1.
132. See Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, supra note 4, at 1185–93 (urging
the SEC not to ban PDAAs in customer agreements).

